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Introduction 
n 28th April 2015, Sri Lanka 
recorded an historic constitutional 
milestone when its Parliament 
enacted the Nineteenth Amendment to the 
1978 Constitution. The process of its 
drafting and enactment had been 
disorganised and opaque, its passage in 
Parliament fought clause by clause by the 
opposition, and the final content of the 
amendment was a much-diluted version of 
the original proposals of the government. 
But this was nevertheless the most 
substantial reduction of the powers of the 
executive president since the introduction 
of that office in 1977. Even though since 
the mid-1990s various presidential 
candidates had obtained repeated mandates 
for its abolition,1 once in office they had 
not merely broken the promise, but in the 
case of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 
2010, actually expanded its powers.2     
Since the dramatic ouster of the 
Rajapaksa regime in the presidential 
election of January 2015, the new Sri 
Lanka government headed by President 
Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremesinghe has been engaged 
                                                
1 The winning candidates in the 1994, 1999, and 
2005 presidential elections unequivocally promised 
abolition of the executive presidency. While in 
2010 the promise was more amorphous, it was still 
suggested that substantial reforms to cut back its 
powers would be made.  
2 The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
(2010) removed the two-term limit on presidential 
office and procedural restraints on presidential 
powers. See R. Edrisinha & A. Jayakody (Eds.) 
(2011) The Eighteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution: Substance and Process (Colombo: 
CPA). 
in a 100-day reform programme. The 
centrepiece of this programme was the 
abolition or at least the reform of the 
executive presidency. In challenging 
President Rajapaksa, there was the widest 
consensus among the parties involved in 
the Sirisena candidacy that something 
must be done to reduce the deleterious 
consequences of the uncontrolled 
presidency. Executive presidentialism has 
been opposed on grounds of constitutional 
democracy ever since it was first proposed, 
but especially after the expansion of its 
powers through the Eighteenth 
Amendment, these problems had become 
acute.3 However, there was less consensus 
on whether the remedy was to abolish 
presidentialism altogether and return to a 
parliamentary system, or whether the 
benefits of presidentialism could be 
retained whilst removing its more 
egregious features.   
While such debates about systems of 
government are common to any 
constitutional reform exercise, in practice 
choices between presidential and 
parliamentary models found in political 
science and constitutional law textbooks 
are never clear-cut. Heuristic models help 
in clarifying the available options and their 
strengths and weaknesses no doubt, but 
ultimately constitutional choices about the 
system of government are decided by 
contextual factors. History and culture – or 
more accurately in a plural polity, histories 
                                                
3 See J. Wickramaratne, ‘The Executive 
Presidency: A Left Perspective’ and R. Edrisinha, 
‘Constitutionalism and Sri Lanka’s Gaullist 
Presidential System’ in A. Welikala (Ed.) (2015) 
Reforming Sri Lankan Presidentialism: 
Provenance, Problems and Prospects (Colombo: 
CPA): Chs.27, 28. 
O 
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and cultures – influence the way more 
fundamental ideas like nation, state, and 
sovereignty are conceived, and these in 
turn determine how institutions of 
government are designed. In the mid-
1960s, J.R. Jayewardene’s advocacy of 
presidentialism was based on rationales of 
practical politics. He identified the 
transience of parliamentary majorities as a 
major weakness of the post-colonial 
political system when seen against the 
requirements of a stable and relatively 
enduring executive for rapid economic 
development.4 When he eventually 
obtained the power to introduce 
presidentialism in the late-1970s, the 
legitimating arguments he used for this 
radical constitutional innovation took a 
more pronounced historical and cultural 
turn in drawing upon parallels directly 
from the pre-colonial Sinhala-Buddhist 
monarchy.5 
This example of how presidentialism 
was designed and legitimated points us to 
a number of salient matters to bear in mind 
when discussing the reform of that 
institution almost forty years thence. 
Firstly, it reminds us of the importance of 
the “dialectical relationship between 
tradition and modernity” in most post-
colonial contexts such as Sri Lanka, and 
the “powers of tradition to evolve 
                                                
4 See his seminal 1966 speech to the Ceylon 
Association for the Advancement of Science cited 
in K.M. de Silva & H. Wriggins (1994) J.R. 
Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography, 
Vol.II (London: Leo Cooper): pp.377-9. 
5 S. Kemper, ‘J.R. Jayewardene: Righteousness 
and Realpolitik’ in J. Spencer (Ed.) (1990) Sri 
Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict (London: 
Routledge): Ch.9; R. de Silva Wijeyeratne, 
‘Cosmology, Presidentialism and J.R. 
Jayewardene’s Constitutional Imaginary’ in 
Welikala (2015): Ch.14. 
creatively in a new environment.”6 The 
interrelationship between the traditional 
and the modern therefore is central to our 
analytical understanding of contemporary 
political institutions and political 
mobilisation. Flowing from this, secondly, 
is the methodological caution against 
relying solely on modern positivist 
categories of institutional design. If we see 
reforming presidentialism as solely about 
the relative merits of positivist models of 
presidentialism and parliamentarism, we 
fail to appreciate the deeper ideas about 
collective identity and the state that are at 
play in the societal conversation about 
institutional reform.7 Thirdly, we need to 
have a proper understanding of the process 
of constitutional change that Sri Lanka is 
currently undertaking, its character, and its 
temporal span. What happened in the 
January 2015 presidential election was not 
a routine change of government followed 
by changes in policy direction; it was a 
fully-fledged regime change aimed at 
bringing about a constitutional transition 
from a burgeoning ethnocratic state to a 
republican constitutional democracy. The 
reform moment began in mid-2014 and 
gained inexorable momentum throughout 
the latter half of the year with a growing 
coalescence of the broadest array of 
political parties and civil society groups 
ever mobilised against a sitting president. 
If the present government is re-elected in 
the forthcoming parliamentary election, 
the reform moment will not end with the 
                                                
6 S. Amunugama, ‘Ideology and Class Interest in 
One of Piyadasa Sirisena’s Novels: The New Image 
of the ‘Sinhala Buddhist’ Nationalist’ in M. 
Roberts (Ed.) (1997) Sri Lanka: Collective 
Identities Revisited, Vol.I: Ch.11 at p.342. 
7 A. Welikala, ‘Nation, State, Sovereignty and 
Kingship: The Pre-Modern Antecedents of the 
Presidential State’ in Welikala (2015): Ch.13. 
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current series of reforms but will go on 
until a new constitution is negotiated, 
drafted, and adopted at some point in the 
next Parliament.  
These analytical, methodological, and 
contextual considerations will inform the 
discussion to follow. While I will discuss 
recent political events for the purpose of 
establishing the context especially in 
relation to the nature of the recent reform 
process, the main aim of this essay is not 
empirical but theoretical. Underlying the 
debates and disagreements about 
institutional form – about presidentialism 
and parliamentarism or a combination of 
these – is a much deeper cleavage of 
political opinion about the very nature of 
the Sri Lankan state. Those who voted for 
Rajapaksa and others who voted for 
Sirisena reflected fundamentally different 
worldviews. The former voted to retain a 
strong presidential state not because of 
some inherent affinity with that form of 
government, but because it mapped on to a 
particular historical and cultural 
conception of the state that is heavily 
informed by the ideology of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism. The majority that 
voted for Sirisena, I argue, desired a 
restoration of an alternative tradition of the 
Sri Lankan state, which is influenced by a 
modernist conception of republican 
statehood. Theorising these competing 
views about the nature of the state is 
important not merely because of the 
analytical clarity that it imparts to our 
understanding of the transition from the 
Rajapaksa to the Sirisena presidencies, but 
also because they will continue to 
influence the way the Sri Lankan 
electorate votes in the imminent 
parliamentary election. This will in turn 
determine whether there is in fact a new 
constitution-making attempt in the next 
Parliament, and if so, the institutional 
choices that are made within that exercise.        
 
The constitutional moment between and 
beyond elections 
By the middle of 2014, when the reform 
movement that led to the regime change of 
January 2015 started gathering pace, the 
Rajapaksa government seemed at its peak 
political strength. On the back of the 
euphoria over the victory in the war 
against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, Rajapaksa 
had overwhelmingly won the January 
2010 presidential election. He built upon 
that with a comprehensive win in the 
parliamentary elections of April 2010.8 In 
mobilising the public and especially his 
core constituency in the South in the war 
effort, the regime had drawn upon Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism’s martial tropes 
copiously and without any heed to 
minority sensitivities.9 In September 2010, 
the Eighteenth Amendment consolidated 
the hyper-presidential state by the 
abolition of term limits, the removal of 
restraints on presidential powers over key 
official appointments, and the enervation 
of the independent governance 
commissions.10 In securing the two-thirds 
parliamentary majority needed for the 
enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment 
the regime had co-opted opposition 
                                                
8 L. Jayasuriya (2012) The Changing Face of 
Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka (1994-2010) 
(Colombo: SSA): Ch.6. 
9 N. Wickramasinghe, ‘Producing the Present: 
History as Heritage in Post-War Patriotic Sri 
Lanka’ (2012) ICES Research Paper No.2 
(Colombo: ICES). 
10 Edrisinha & Jayakody (2011). 
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members through fair means and foul, and 
the continuation of this overwhelming 
government majority neutralised 
Parliament as an effective checking 
mechanism on the executive. Going 
further in January 2013, the regime 
impeached the Chief Justice and by 
replacing her with a partisan legal advisor, 
nullified the independence of the 
judiciary.11 Rather than demobilising the 
armed forces after the war and reducing 
them to levels more appropriate to 
peacetime, wartime strengths were 
continued and used for militarising vast 
areas of civil administration, especially but 
not exclusively in the Tamil-majority 
North.12 The public service, the foreign 
service, the police, the armed services, and 
the state media had been pervasively 
politicised, and members of the Rajapaksa 
family controlled every key lever of power 
and authority in the Sri Lankan state.  
The construction of this outwardly 
impregnable fortress of constitutional and 
informal power was repeatedly validated 
by a relentless succession of local and 
provincial elections, which debilitated the 
political opposition. Civil society was 
emasculated under a pervasive climate of 
fear and impunity. Beneath this seeming 
invincibility of the Rajapaksa presidential 
state, however, multiple sources of 
discontent were developing, stemming 
from its ethnic divisiveness, the 
lawlessness of the ruling elite, the 
                                                
11 N. Anketell & A. Welikala (2013) A Systemic 
Crisis in Context: The Impeachment of the Chief 
Justice, the Independence of the Judiciary, and the 
Rule of Law in Sri Lanka (Colombo: CPA). 
12 International Crisis Group, ‘Forever War? 
Military Control in Sri Lanka’s North’: 
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/asia/2014/03/25/the-
forever-war-military-control-in-sri-lankas-north/ 
(accessed 04.05.2015)  
inescapable nepotism, the ubiquitous 
corruption, the absence of an economic 
dividend from the end of the war, 
authoritarianism and the culture of 
impunity, and the creeping constriction of 
democratic freedoms Sri Lankans had 
traditionally taken for granted. The 
increasingly authoritarian state had either 
closed off normal institutional channels for 
the expression and mitigation of these 
grievances (such as law enforcement and 
the administration of justice) or 
undermined others to the point where they 
were meaningless (such as Parliament and 
other elected legislative bodies).     
In this context, the reform movement 
brought together a wide number of civil 
society groups and political parties 
opposed to the Rajapaksas who could 
agree on two principal matters: that the 
breakdown of the rule of law and 
pervasive corruption needed to be 
addressed; and that major constitutional 
reforms were needed for this purpose, with 
the abolition or the extensive reform of the 
executive presidency being the main 
requirement. In building this broad 
coalition, all other more tendentious 
matters were excluded, in particular the 
issues relating to a resolution of the causes 
of ethnic conflict. While addressing 
minority demands for devolution and 
power-sharing is as important as 
democracy reforms in Sri Lanka, this was 
a wise strategic move on the part of the 
reform movement in the context of what 
needed to be done in 2014. This enabled 
the broadest possible coalition to be built 
against Rajapaksa, including on the one 
hand the Jathika Hela Urumaya (a small 
but influential party of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists), on the other, the Tamil 
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National Alliance (the conglomeration of 
the main Tamil nationalist parties), and 
everything in-between including the main 
opposition United National Party, other 
minority parties, and a sizable section of 
Rajapaksa’s own Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party.  
While the visible signs of the 
formation of an opposition coalition may 
not have worried the regime too much 
initially, a substantial reduction in the 
government’s winning vote-share in the 
elections to the Uva Provincial Council in 
September 2014 clearly panicked it into 
calling an early presidential election 
almost two years before the next was due 
in November 2016. This seemed to be 
based on the rationale that, against the 
diminishing returns of incumbency, 
regime consolidation would be best served 
by making use of its biggest electoral asset 
in the form of President Rajapaksa 
himself. Together with the ability to 
customarily disregard the electoral law and 
the misuse of public resources that comes 
with the control of the state, it may have 
seemed to the regime like the routine 
application of a tried and tested formula.  
However, the reform movement scored 
a major win when in November 2014 it 
persuaded Rajapaksa’s Minister of Health 
and the General Secretary of the SLFP, 
Maithripala Sirisena, to defect to the 
opposition to become the common 
opposition candidate. The regime’s usual 
tactic of deploying the patriot/traitor 
dichotomy against its opponents lost much 
of its purchase with Sirisena as the 
common candidate. That for the first time 
in the post-war era there was now a real 
contest was demonstrated by the regime’s 
increasing desperation in the final few 
weeks and days of the campaign in which 
it abandoned any restraint whatsoever in 
the abuse of state power and the misuse of 
public resources against the opposition.13 
But all this was eventually to no avail, for 
the idea of reform had captured the public 
imagination and led to the emergence of 
Sirisena as the clear winner in the early 
hours of 9th January.  
Two salient points require emphasis. 
Firstly, that this reform movement could 
not only be created but could also offer a 
programme that a majority of Sri Lankans 
found plausible demonstrates that despite 
decades of institutional decay and soft 
authoritarianism – a trend that was only 
exacerbated and not created by the 
Rajapaksa regime – the basic democratic 
ideal had intuitive appeal to the public. 
The long-term travails of Sri Lankan 
democracy such as ethnicisation, 
clientelism, and sectional nationalism are 
extensively commented upon in the 
literature.14 But the reform movement and 
its electoral success tells us that there is 
something interesting to be explored about 
Sri Lanka as a (non-liberal) democracy, 
                                                
13 See for a review of the unprecedented corruption 
and abuses involved: Transparency International 
Sri Lanka (2015) Electoral Integrity: A Review of 
the Abuse of State Resources and Selected Integrity 
Issues in the 2015 Presidential Election in Sri 
Lanka: http://www.tisrilanka.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/PPPR_2015_ENG_Final.
pdf (accessed 04.05.2015) 
14 See e.g., the essays in J. Uyangoda (Ed.) (2013) 
State Reform in Sri Lanka: Issues, Directions and 
Perspectives (Colombo: SSA); J. Goodhand, J. 
Spencer & B. Korf (Eds.) (2011) Conflict and 
Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace 
Trap? (Abingdon: Routledge); K. Stokke & J. 
Uyangoda (Eds.) (2011) Liberal Peace in 
Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in 
Sri Lanka (London: Anthem Press); J. Spencer 
(Ed.) (1990) Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of 
Conflict (London: Routledge).  
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which seems to have deeper roots than 
many would have thought possible in the 
intolerant triumphalism of the immediate 
aftermath of the war. Secondly, that the 
parties representing Tamil, Muslim, and 
Indian Tamil interests considered that 
democratisation should be prioritised over 
their own specific demands is important. 
While this could be explained on strategic 
or even tactical grounds, there is a deeper 
significance to the coincidence of interests 
created by the opposition to the Rajapaksa 
regime, as a spontaneous unifying moment 
of otherwise competing ethnic interests, 
around a substantively democratic 
conception of the Sri Lankan state and 
polity. This points to a rich seam of 
goodwill that could potentially be tapped 
in any future constitution-making exercise 
and the development of a just settlement of 
Sri Lanka’s ethnic and religious 
pluralism.15 It also belies the ludicrous 
claims made by the Rajapaksas and their 
intellectual sycophants that the Tamils in 
particular are congenitally anti-Sri Lankan 
and chronically secessionist.16  
If these were the political motivations 
that underpinned the popular reform 
movement, then the regime change at the 
                                                
15 R. Sampanthan, ‘The Ilankai Thamil Arasu 
Katchi (Federal Party) and the Post-Independence 
Politics of Ethnic Pluralism: Tamil Nationalism 
Before and After the Republic’ in A. Welikala (Ed.) 
(2012) The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections 
on Constitutional History, Theory and Practice 
(Colombo: CPA): Ch.24. 
16 See e.g., D. Jayatilleka, ‘Parliamentary Election: 
The Real Stakes’, Colombo Telegraph, 5th May 
2015: 
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/parli
amentary-election-the-real-stakes/; D. Jayatilleka, 
‘The Three Stooges in a Long Hot Summer’, 




presidential election was only the first 
concrete step towards the realisation of the 
reformist goals, and the 100-day 
programme promised in the common 
opposition manifesto was the second step 
of this process. The moderately successful 
achievement of these aims through the 
enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment 
could be regarded as the end of the process 
and of the reform moment, but for two 
factors. Firstly, the reforms require to be 
entrenched in practice over the short to 
medium term, and for this they need to be 
democratically validated at the 
forthcoming parliamentary election. Put 
another way, the change of the old regime 
at the presidential election requires to be 
followed up with the consolidation of the 
new regime at the parliamentary election. 
For this reason, as with the presidential 
election if not more so, the parliamentary 
election will not be a routine exercise of 
electoral democracy based on a choice of 
competing sets of party policies, but a 
validating exercise for a deeper re-
conceptualisation of the Sri Lankan state 
as a constitutional republic. 
Secondly, the ethnic and religious 
minorities that voted en masse for the 
common opposition candidate, as noted 
above, did so without any expectation that 
their problems would be addressed in the 
100-day programme. This however does 
not imply that they are content with the 
limited governance reforms; in fact there is 
a fundamental and entirely reasonable and 
legitimate expectation that devolution and 
power-sharing issues would be taken up in 
the next Parliament. Hence the strong 
indications by the current government that 
work would begin on drafting a new 
constitution after the elections.  
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In this way we can see that the 
constitutional reform moment that began 
with the first signs of the revival of 
democratic forces against the Rajapaksas 
in mid-2014 would not cease with their 
departure, but could continue for a 
considerable period of time until a 
reasonable settlement for all the peoples of 
Sri Lanka can be arrived at. It is in this 
context that we need a deeper 
conceptualisation of the models of 
statehood that are in competition within 
the current reform period.   
 
Two counterposed models of the state 
and constitutional change: ethnocracy v. 
republicanism   
Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala 
Sirisena offered radically different visions 
of the polity during the presidential 
campaign. Cast as ideal-types, Rajapaksa’s 
vision saw the Sri Lankan state as a 
Sinhala-Buddhist ethnocracy, whereas 
Sirisena’s goal was the introduction of 
‘yaha paalanaya’. This Sinhalese term, 
which translates as ‘good governance’, 
was initially used as the common 
opposition’s principal campaign slogan. 
But as keen observers have noted, in the 
public discourse during the election 
campaign, it assumed an unanticipated 
resonance as a moral concept of good 
government.17 An associated term was 
‘maithri paalanaya’ – ‘compassionate 
governance’ – which is both a play on 
Sirisena’s first name as well as a reference 
to the Buddhist concept of ‘loving 
                                                
17 J. Uyangoda, ‘State and Governance Reforms 




kindness’ (‘maithreya’ in Sinhala and 
‘metta’ in Sanskrit). In Buddhist 
eschatology, moreover, the next Buddha, 
the fifth of the bhadrakalpa, will be known 
as Maithri. In this context, therefore, the 
content and meaning of ‘good governance’ 
could be rather different from the liberal 
sense and international usage of the term, 
even though its precise contours remain 
inarticulate. 
Whatever the spiritual and cultural 
connotations of these terms, it seems 
possible to clarify their secular content in 
the light of the reforms and principles 
associated with the idea of yaha paalanaya. 
I argue below that what it denoted was the 
restoration of an orthodox model of 
republican statehood, categorically against 
the corrupt, ethnocratic, and monarchic 
form of presidentialism of the post-war 
Rajapaksa regime. Building these stylised 
models helps us understand the two 
competing approaches, and define their 
differences, more sharply. They remain, 
however, analytical constructs and I would 
surmise that neither the candidates nor 
their intellectual exegetists would 
necessarily articulate their claims in 
exactly the same way that I set out here.  
(i) The Rajapaksa model: ethnocratic 
monarchical presidentialism 
An ethnocracy is a type of state that 
combines the practice of majoritarian 
democracy with the ethnicisation of 
politics.18 It arises in plural polities in 
which one dominant ethnic group, which 
asserts a primacy within the historical and 
territorial space of the polity, and therefore 
                                                
18 O. Yiftachel (2006) Ethnocracy: Law and 
Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press): pp.295-6. 
www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 10 
claims to the ownership of the state, seeks 
to enforce an hierarchy of ethnic relations 
as the very basis of the constitutional 
order. It appropriates the state and uses its 
resources for the advancement of the 
dominant group, which necessarily 
involves the subordination and sometimes 
the violent suppression of minority groups. 
The resulting resistance by minorities may 
perversely take an ethnocratic form 
itself.19 The cultural resources of ethnicity 
provide the animating values of politics in 
ethnocracies, not secular values of 
constitutional democracy. They may vary 
in the level of oppression used against 
minorities, but they usually allow some 
forms of political representation and rights 
to minorities, while denying the most 
fundamental of the minorities’ rights 
claims. They are not unelected 
dictatorships, but ethnocratic states 
legitimise their authoritarian control over 
the plural polity by recourse to ethno-
cultural populism and democratic 
majoritarianism. Due to the fundamental 
injustice upon which the constitutional 
order is built, ethnocracies denude their 
own control aims by being chronically 
unstable and conflict-ridden.       
The Rajapaksa regime displayed all 
these ethnocratic characteristics. Its main 
basis of political mobilisation and regime 
legitimation was a chauvinistic version of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.20 The 
political, cultural, and historical claims of 
the majority nation supplanted the civic 
conception of an inclusive Sri Lankan 
                                                
19 J. Uyangoda, ‘Travails of State Reform in the 
Context of Protracted Civil War in Sri Lanka’ in 
Stokke Uyangoda (2011): Ch.2 at p.55. 
20 S.J. Tambiah (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic 
Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy 
(Chicago: Chicago UP): pp.92-102. 
nation. Secular law was increasingly 
replaced with ethnic politics, including 
monarchical traditions of political power, 
in the way power and authority were 
organised and exercised. The nation-state 
defined this way was constructed 
unambiguously against minority claims to 
equality and autonomy. The resulting 
tension and conflict-potential were 
addressed via increasing control and 
militarisation. A political constitution 
derived from the mytho-historical 
worldview of Sinhala-Buddhist nativism 
constantly superseded the surviving 
remnants of legal modernity as reflected in 
the text of the legal constitution. 
Monarchical motifs from Sinhala-Buddhist 
historiography were widely used to 
rearticulate the nature and purpose of 
presidential power.21 
The regime also went further than 
nationalism in its sheer extractive appetite. 
As noted, clientelism and corruption were 
pervasive, facilitated by the breakdown of 
the rule of law and the arbitrariness of 
family rule. In short, the Sri Lankan state, 
which despite its many limitations – 
including most importantly its congenital 
incapacity to accommodate minority 
claims – had maintained a formally 
constitutional and democratic character,22 
was transmogrified into an organised cartel 
for the furtherance of the economic 
interests of the ruling family and its 
clients. If the ethnocratic aspect of the 
regime provided it with populist 
                                                
21 Wickramasinghe (2012); M. Roberts, ‘Mahinda 
Rajapaksa as Modern Mahāvāsala and Font of 
Clemency? The Roots of Populist 
Authoritarianism’ in Welikala (2015): Ch.17. 
22 J. Uyangoda, ‘The Puzzle of State Reform during 
the Civil War: Contexts, Barriers and Outcomes’ in 
Uyangoda (2013): Ch.3. 
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legitimacy, it was this latter dimension that 
eroded its electoral support even within its 
core constituency. It is the factor of 
corruption and excess that mainly explains 
how a nationalist and populist president 
dissipated a majority of nearly two million 
votes within four years. Sirisena’s 
programme was sufficiently attractive for a 
substantial segment of Rajapaksa’s core 
constituency to desert him, and I now 
consider the main elements of this 
alternative vision of the country.  
(ii) The Sirisena model: Yaha Paalanaya 
as republicanism  
Republicanism is a set of ideas and 
practices concerned with the common 
good, which is opposed to political 
tyranny and corruption, and which 
foregrounds the concept of civic virtue as 
the defining feature of a well-governed 
polity. There are three principal elements 
to the ideal republican state. These are: 
anti-monarchism and popular sovereignty; 
the notion of ‘non-domination’ as the basis 
of freedom; and the value of accountability 
and its institutional design.23 A republic is 
of course the binary opposite to a 
monarchy as a type of state. But more 
normatively, republicanism represents the 
view that the ultimate power and authority 
to govern a polity – sovereignty – 
emanates from the people (therefore, 
‘popular’ sovereignty) and that it is 
created, exercised, and reproduced in an 
on-going political relationship between the 
people and their governing institutions.24 It 
rejects the view that sovereignty vests in a 
hereditary office, or originates in some 
                                                
23 A. Tomkins (2005) Our Republican Constitution 
(Oxford: Hart): pp.57-65. 
24 M. Loughlin (2003) The Idea of Public Law 
(Oxford: OUP): p.83. 
metaphysical source. Second, the idea of 
non-domination is a complex and 
multifaceted concept, but for our purposes 
what it means is the rejection of all forms 
of arbitrary government, the corollary of 
which is the assurance of accountability of 
government to the people.25 The scope for 
arbitrariness is reduced in a republic by the 
provision of robust mechanisms to ensure 
limits on the extent of governmental 
power, procedures to confine and structure 
its exercise, and most importantly, the 
space for citizens to continuously have a 
say in the process of government. The 
principle of non-domination thus carries 
three consequences: (a) open government 
and freedom of information, so that 
government in the public interest may be 
ensured; (b) civic virtue, or a citizenry 
concerned with ensuring the common 
good and assuming some personal 
responsibility towards realising it; and (c) 
equality, which is again a complicated 
concept, but here understood as the 
assurance of basic legal, political, and 
socio-economic conditions in order that 
citizens can play the role expected of them 
by the republican ideal. Finally, there is 
little value in merely declaring these 
normative values and aims as desirable 
goods if there are no means by which they 
can be actualised. Republicanism therefore 
pays serious attention to how institutions 
might be designed so as to ensure 
accountability of government.  
Even though it was not explicitly 
defended as such, it can plausibly be 
argued that Sirisena’s manifesto closely 
conformed to the requirements of this 
conceptualisation of the republican ideal. 
                                                
25 P. Pettit (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of 
Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon). 
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The 100-day programme was entirely 
about institutional reforms that are aimed 
at realising the republican norms outlined 
above, and equally important is the 
deliberate change of leadership style. The 
new President has been at pains to 
demonstrate the public service dimension 
of the institution, in contrast to the 
ostentation and grandiloquence of his 
predecessor. In substantially reducing the 
powers of the executive presidency, the 
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration 
has rejected the monarchism associated 
with that institution. Substantively, what 
the pruning of presidentialism entails is the 
expansion of democracy, through better 
checks and balances, lesser arbitrariness, 
and more space for participation and 
consultation. Not only is the executive 
reshaped, but Parliament is also to be 
strengthened, by improving its scrutinising 
capacity through a reform of the 
committee system. Both political and legal 
accountability is the underlying aim of the 
proposals to remove the blanket legal 
immunity of the President (the Nineteenth 
Amendment subjects the President to the 
fundamental rights jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court) and to make the executive 
responsible to Parliament. The Nineteenth 
Amendment has made the right to 
information a fundamental constitutional 
right, and this will be reinforced with 
enactment of freedom of information 
legislation currently under preparation.  
The Sirisena administration 
demonstrates a commitment to equality in 
its economic policy as reflected in the 
interim budget of January and its cost of 
living reliefs. Some of its fiscal measures – 
such as the one-off tax on certain 
categories of businesses that were clear 
beneficiaries of Rajapaksa largesse or the 
so-called ‘mansion tax’ that targets the 
same group – have been controversial, but 
might be defended at least in principle on 
grounds of republican equality. The new 
government is also based on a 
commitment to some form of political 
equality, which is important in two ways. 
Firstly, in appealing to the notion of a 
political community that has the capacity 
for constitutional renewal and to self-
correct the democratic sanction for 
authoritarianism, and secondly, in 
eschewing the ethnic hierarchy denoted by 
the ethnocratic model, and appealing to the 
minorities to join the common purpose of 
rebuilding the post-war nation on a basis 
of pluralism and equality. The latter aspect 
may not satisfy, indeed may be wholly 
inadequate, as a policy response to the 
sub-state nationality claim asserted by the 
Tamils,26 but it does denote that at least 
symbolically the new government is 
responsive to the claims of minorities. In 
recognising the plural character of the Sri 
Lankan polity, the new dispensation 
impliedly recognises the validity and 
legitimacy of minority claims to 
accommodation. That is a promising start, 
and a decisive renunciation of Rajapaksa 
ethnocracy.  
In this way we can see how sharply 
differentiated was the choice between the 
two models of polity and state that were 
offered by the respective presidential 
candidates. It is therefore a matter of 
historic significance that the electorate 
chose to regain the dignity and self-worth 
                                                
26 A. Welikala, ‘Constitutional Form and Reform in 
Sri Lanka: Towards a Plurinational 
Understanding’ in M. Tushnet & M. Khosla (Eds.) 
(forthcoming, 2015) Unstable Constitutionalism: 
Law and Politics in South Asia (Cambridge: CUP). 
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of citizenship implied by the republican 
model, and reject the authoritarian 
domination, the lack of accountability, and 
the political injustice of an ethnocracy in a 
plural society represented by the 
Rajapaksa regime. And for reasons already 
canvassed, this dichotomy of models with 
regard to the nature of the Sri Lankan state 
will form the inevitable backdrop for the 
political contest to come in the 
parliamentary elections. It is hoped that the 
conceptualisation of the two models 
offered here helps us understand what is at 
stake not only in that election but also for 
the future of reform. 
 
Conclusion: continuing challenges 
While the desire for yaha paalanaya could 
be theorised in its best light as a 
democratic republican ideal as I have 
proposed above, in practice the process of 
the 100-day reforms left much to be 
desired. There was a lack of substantive 
coherence and core agreement among the 
coalition partners, process requirements 
such as transparency and public 
participation were often disregarded, and 
the programme was riven with problems of 
sequencing and prioritisation. Aside from 
these process weaknesses, there are two 
major political challenges to the 
continuing reform process, the 
management of which will test the new 
government’s ability and competence to 
the full. These are the twin challenges to 
the very idea of reform posed by 
ethnonational extremism on both sides of 
the ethnic divide. 
Mahinda Rajapaksa may have been 
defeated in the presidential election and 
forced to cede the leadership of the SLFP 
but he has not gone gracefully into 
retirement. Neither have his more zealous 
supporters, whose political survival 
depends on his active role in politics, 
allowed him to do so. He has made 
regrettably divisive comments unworthy of 
a former President of the Republic, both he 
and his supporters in politics and the press 
have sought to question the legitimacy of 
his successor’s election, and they have 
actively sought to undermine the 100-day 
programme at every turn. Among others, 
one of the most deleterious of these 
arguments has been to highlight the fact 
that Rajapaksa won a majority of the votes 
of the Sinhala majority, whereas Sirisena 
won the election only with the help of the 
minorities. The implication is that the 
latter can be expected to betray Sinhalese 
interests and undermine the war victory 
against Tamil secessionism. In this way 
they seek to destroy the significance of the 
presidential election as a unifying moment 
at which all of Sri Lanka’s ethnic 
communities came together for the 
common purpose of restoring democracy 
and the rule of law. The SLFP has 
distanced itself from Rajapaksa and the 
various initiatives and public rallies 
organised by his supporters to galvanise a 
political movement calling for his return as 
the SLFP prime ministerial candidate in 
coming parliamentary election. It is 
difficult to predict whether these efforts 
will succeed or fizzle out. But this is 
clearly a challenge, which if it is not 
addressed with firm resolve and an appeal 
to the better instincts of the Sinhalese, that 
can derail the reforms, defeat the 
government, and reinstate the manic 
nationalism that was the hallmark of Sri 
Lankan politics in the recent past.   
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Similarly, Tamil moderates are 
increasingly being challenged by latent 
separatists and hardliners within Tamil 
nationalist politics, on the grounds that the 
moderates’ willingness to work with the 
new government is a sell-out of Tamil 
interests. The new government has taken 
certain measures to address Tamil 
grievances, including the appointment of 
civilian Governors for the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, the release of some 
military-occupied land, and commencing a 
process of accounting for missing persons, 
and a review of those held under anti-
terrorism laws. These are admittedly small 
and incremental, and their implementation 
is fitful at best, but the government is 
attempting to balance a complicated set of 
interests, including to foreclose the 
possibility of a Rajapaksa resurgence in 
the South if it is perceived as being too 
soft on Tamil demands. The government’s 
insistence that deeper constitutional issues 
in response to Tamil autonomy demands 
can only be taken up after the general 
election, its policy that an accountability 
mechanism for alleged atrocity crimes 
during the final stages of the war can only 
be domestic and not an international 
investigation, and its successful request to 
the United Nations Human Rights Council 
for a deferral until September of the report 
the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Investigation on Sri 
Lanka,27 have all inflamed Tamil 
nationalists’ view that their demands are 
being overlooked. While in essence these 
complaints are legitimate, the intemperate 
and self-defeating ways in which these 
                                                
27 OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/O
ISL.aspx (accessed 06.03.2015) 
vocal elements are conducting their 
campaigns of opposition could very well 
signal a fatal disruption of the fragile 
reforms process. It is clear that the 
government can do more to assuage Tamil 
fears and that it must ensure that both 
moderate Tamil opinion and leaders are 
strengthened against the extremists.28 A 
fair and just settlement for the minorities 
must also be transparently articulated, and 
openly defended within Southern politics, 
and it is more than likely that the moderate 
majority of the Sinhalese would support 
the government rather than the intolerant 
extremists.   
These two challenges from both North 
and South, then, have the potential to 
destroy the reform moment. Whether Sri 
Lanka manages to consolidate the historic 
gains of the 2015 presidential election, and 
to set itself on an irreversible path of 
democratisation and progress with the 
forthcoming general election, will 
therefore depend not only on the skill, tact, 
and acumen of President Maithripala 
Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremesinghe in navigating the 
treacherous waters of ethnonationalist 
politics, but also whether the state-wide 
republican majority will hold against the 
ethnocratic majority within the ethnic 
majority.
                                                
28 R. Hoole et al, ‘Internal Political Power Bashing 
in the Name of Justice for War Victims’, The 
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